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Abstract 
!
 Models of tax competition can include various features to amend the key conclusion 
of the canonical literature that states that capital mobility leads to the under-provision of 
public goods. This paper investigates if that result still holds once shared public goods are 
introduced, relating to concepts present in the ﬁscal federalism literature. This is 
particularly relevant if we consider the case of the European Union that develops federal 
wide public goods and policies, while having its members countries competing ﬁscally. 
 We propose a model with diﬀerent tax bases at the local and the federal levels and 
show that sharing the public good can restore optimum. Second, we study how this is not 
possible in a model with overlapping tax bases. We also present a model with transfers.  
!
!
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1 Introduction 
 As a sign that they are crucial parameters to understand the provision of public goods    
and the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal systems, base erosion and ﬁscal incentives have become over 
the past few years a high proﬁle topic for policy makers and media . Indeed, governments 1
are becoming increasingly concerned about the lack of an uniﬁed international framework 
when it comes to corporate taxation, afraid of losing tax revenue to other countries and 
hence tempted to protect themselves from base erosion with unilateral measures (OECD, 
2013a). Concerns over a harmful tax competition and the lack of coordination have been 
voiced by the European Commission (1997) and the OECD (1998, 2000). Namely, issues 
include falling corporate income taxes that could lead to loss in revenue, and potential 
shifts of the tax burden on labor that could create unemployment. Hence, the G20 ﬁnance 
ministers asked the OECD to develop a set of guidelines designed to address those issues, 
known as the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Proﬁt Shifting (BEPS). Such work of the 
OECD provides us with some data on base erosion. Although it is impossible to assess with 
certainty the extent of BEPS behaviors, the organization states that they are widespread. 
Data on corporate income tax rates draws a downward trend, with a statutory rate in 
OECD countries that dropped from 32.6 to 25.4% on average over the period 2000-2011 
(OECD, 2013b). There were tax rate cuts in 31 OECD countries, a trend that seemed to 
be initiated by a series of tax reforms in the United Kingdom and the United States during 
the 1980’s. 
 The literature on tax competition, displayed in section 2, is extensive and its key    
conclusion is that capital mobility, by eroding the tax base when a tax rate increases, leads 
to downward pressure on tax rates and an under-provision of public goods. The goal of this 
"4
 see « The Great Corporate Tax Dodge » by Bloomberg, http://topics.bloomberg.com/the-great-corporate-1
tax-dodge/ for further work
paper is to shed new light on those interactions by setting up a model that includes an 
unprecedented feature : a shared public good. Indeed, there is a lack of literature that 
attempts at explaining the provision of federation wide public goods. 
Regarding the case of the European Union, the importance of such goods have been 
highlighted on several occasions. National submissions to EU budget reviews include the 
following : « If the EU budget is to generate the added value called for by the European 
Council, the structure of the budget must be revised to enable the Union to focus on 
supporting growth, competitiveness, expertise and innovations in policy areas where it is 
able to operate more eﬀectively than the Member States, and to produce European level 
public goods, such as internal and external security and protection of the 
environment. » (European Commission, 2007-08). So far, policies at the EU level include 
namely agriculture, with the Common Agriculture Policy accounting for 46.7% of the total 
budget in 2006 , expected to decrease to 32% in 2013 . Moreover, expenditures include 2 3
regional support to poorer regions through structural funds representing 30.4% of total 
budget in 2006, expected to rise up to 36% in 2013. Finally, internal policies (education, 
youth, culture, Trans-European networks, environment), represented around 8.5% of total 
budget in 2006. Expenditures at the EU level are funded by raising revenue on own 
resources sources, the largest contribution coming from GNI-based resources followed by 
VAT-based ones. Regarding the former, European citizens are taxed portion of VAT levied 
in each member country at various rates, although steps are being taken to harmonize the 
overall tax base. Anyway, the EU budget represented a total of 864.3 billion euros for the 
period 2007-2013, amounting only to 1.05% of the EU-27’s GNI (forecast) . We are far 4
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from the 16.7% GDP that represented the federal tax revenues in the United States in 
2013 .  5
 Those ﬁgures show how low is the EU budget, raising the question of the under-   
provision of federation wide public goods, and this is where the theory on ﬁscal federalism 
comes into play. It studies, as exposed in the next section, how expenditure functions and 
ﬁscal instruments are centralized and decentralized across diﬀerent levels of government. 
We will make us of the diﬀerent interactions that exist vertically (between the local and 
federal layers of government) and horizontally (between the jurisdictions) that stem from 
those allocations to study what could be the impacts of tax competition and base erosion 
on the provision of federal goods ﬁnanced by several countries, just as in the EU. 
 Our paper consists in extending a baseline model of tax competition inspired by Zodrow    
and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1988) by augmenting it with a federal layer : a 
second public good, federal and shared among the diﬀerent countries. In this new setting, 
two countries form a federation, each having an independent government that decides its 
local tax rate to ﬁnance its local non shared good and its federal rate to ﬁnance the federal 
shared good that both enjoy. This in itself is original : most of the models of tax 
competition assume competitive local government and a centralized federal government. 
We use a federation of countries, each setting independently their tax rates as strategic 
variables, to maximize the utility of their respective representative citizen. As an example, 
we can think of an environmental tax that is decided by each country independently and 
that ﬁnances collectively policies on environmental protection, considered as a shared 
federal public good. We consider cases of autarky, in which tax bases cannot erode in 
reaction to a change tax rates, leading to an eﬃcient allocation of resources. In other 
terms, marginal utilities obtained from all sources (private, local and federal public 
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consumptions) are equalized in a ﬁrst best optimum situation. Then, opening up economies 
makes tax bases mobile between the two members which engage in a competition for those 
resources as they can ﬂow in the country that oﬀers the better after tax return. This, and 
this is the key intuition of the canonical tax competition literature, is supposed to lead to a 
« race to the bottom » in tax rates and to an under-provision of public goods. Our paper 
investigates if that result still holds in a situation where the public good is shared across 
the federation. 
 First, we will study a case in which the two public goods are ﬁnanced through source    
taxation of diﬀerent bases. We observe that sharing the ﬁnancing of the public good lowers 
the incentives for the members to undercut each other, reducing the cost of losing tax base 
to the other country. As a result, the under-provision is reduced compared to a situation in 
which the good is not shared, and there can even be over-provision. Even more so, if 
federal tax rates are equalized across the federation, eﬃciency in the provision of that good 
is restored. 
 Second, we turn to case in which both public goods are ﬁnanced through taxation of the    
same base. This is particularly relevant in the EU if we consider VAT taxes that exist 
nationally and at the federal level to ﬁnance the EU budget. We ﬁnd that this produces 
adverse eﬀects in the provision of both public goods. Indeed, and this is another result of 
our paper, overlapping tax bases for two layers of government can magnify the negative 
impact of base erosion and prevent the federation from providing an eﬃcient level of 
federal public good for both countries at the same time. This happens even if countries 
manage to harmonize their rates at the federal level. This result of our model is consistent 
with the literature on vertical ﬁscal externalities in federations, that states that 
overlapping tax bases across diﬀerent layers of government lead to non-optimal decisions 
(Dalhby, 2000, 2003). 
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 Finally, we oﬀer an extension to our model that consists in introducing transfers. We    
show that in this setting increasing transfers reduces the ineﬃciencies for the recipient 
country at the expense of the other. 
 The plan of the paper is the following : a brief literature review is oﬀered in section 2.    
The model is developed in section 3. An extension to that model is presented in section 4. 
Concluding comments are made in section 5.  
!
2 Literature review 
 Our analysis combines segments of the literature on ﬁscal federalism and on tax    
competition.  
 Weingast (2007) displays the characteristics of the two generations of literature    
regarding ﬁscal federalism. The ﬁrst (FGFF) is normative and assumes benevolent social 
planners. It is pioneered by Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) and introduces the 
importance of intergovernmental interactions at the vertical and horizontal levels. Vertical 
imbalances arise when the central layer of the government is better at levying taxes than 
lower levels, while horizontal ones appear if income diverges among same level government 
entities, leading to a diﬀerence in their ability to collect tax revenue. FGFF investigates 
the instruments that could potentially correct those imbalances, such as transfers or 
equalization grants (Boadway et al., 1982). Although they will not take this form in our 
paper, vertical and horizontal eﬀects will arise in our model and their prime importance in 
the design of tax systems will be reﬂected. The second generation of ﬁscal federalism 
literature (SGFF) builds on FGFF while including political choice environments and the 
fact that lower level governments have incentives of their own (Oates, 2005). More positive, 
SGFF includes a large array of literature. To an extent, SGFF will provide less insights 
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than FGFF as we do not include much political choice features in our model except when 
it comes to deﬁning an institutional framework allowing for horizontal equalization. 
 Our model of tax competition is inspired by the synthesized model of Krogstrup (2004),    
that we will present in the next section as our reference model. Indeed, it oﬀers a tractable 
setting that we can easily augment while preserving the key features of tax competition. It 
takes over the seminal papers of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and of Wildasin (1988). 
Those authors formalize models of tax competition in which national governments set tax 
rates to attract an internationally mobile tax base to ﬁnance a public good. The well 
known result of that literature is that countries will compete in tax rates by undercutting 
each other, distorting downward the provision of the public good. Indeed, countries engage 
in a one shot game in which capital can ﬂow in and out in reaction to a change in tax rate, 
to regain the exogenous international after-tax return. Hence, the core concept, mentioned 
above, is base erosion : increasing a rate causes the tax base to shrinks as it ﬂows out to 
other countries, creating an externality that distorts the provision of the public ﬁnanced by 
that tax base. 
 Such a result is put in perspective by allowing less restrictive sets of assumptions, in    
papers mentioned by Krogstrup (2004). For example, the small countries assumption is 
relaxed by Wildasin (1988), allowing for countries to have an impact on the international 
after-tax return. As a result, when countries are large, tax rates are still competed 
downwards but to a lower extent. Similarly, a case of asymmetric countries is considered by 
Bucovetsky (1991) who shows that larger countries choose higher tax rates. Typically, 
those additions (large or asymmetric countries) could be implemented in our augmented 
setting. In this paper we extend the canonical model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) 
and keep its core characteristics without adding those kinds of features, although it could 
be possible. Moreover, the diﬀerence between residence and source based taxation is 
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investigated by Razin and Sadka (1991). Their work shows that residence taxation can if 
enforceable restore optimum and remove distortions in the provision of the public good. 
The second result is that if a second immobile tax base such as labor is used to ﬁnance the 
public good, then the entire tax burned will weight on it. Finally, an important input to 
the reference framework of international tax competition stems from the literature on new 
economic geography. Namely, inputs by Andersson and Forslid (2003) and Baldwin and 
Krugman (2004) show using models of agglomerating economies and diﬀerential rents that 
capital tax rates maintain at a high level in countries with high concentration of 
production while they decrease in countries with low concentration. 
 All those features are examples of extensions that build on the seminal framework of    
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) to amend the key result of the literature that capital 
mobility results in a downward pressure on tax rates and an under-provision of public 
goods. Our paper as mentioned in the introduction consists in coming up with a new one 
that is absent of the current literature : shared federal public goods. We implement in the 
core model the fact that countries ﬁnance together the public good and investigate if its 
provision is still distorted downwards. 
As the literature on tax competition is extensive we can also mention other inputs that 
enrich the modeling of federalism, such as revenue-sharing, tax deductibility or ﬁscal 
equalization. For example, Kelders and Köthenbürger (2005) show that such instruments 
lead to an upward pressure on local tax rates and to a downward one on federal rates. 
Again, those features could be added to our model but this would require further work. 
Stylized facts on tax competition and downward pressure on tax rates are oﬀered by 
Devereux et al. (2002). Using data for 16 countries (the EU and G7) from the early 1980’s 
to late 1990’s, they show, among other stylized facts, that the diﬀerent tax reforms led to a 
fall in tax rates and to a broadening in tax bases. From 1982 to 2001, the unweighted mean 
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statutory tax rate (usual measure for corporate income taxation) decreased from 48 to 35% 
approximatively, with Ireland having the lowest rate at 10%. The other main ﬁnding of the 
paper is that on average, tax reforms implemented in this group of countries led to a 
broadening in tax bases. But, as highlighted by the authors of that same paper, seminal 
papers presented above on tax competition cannot explain such a stylized fact as they do 
not model tax rates and tax bases separately. And since we build on that canonical part of 
the literature on tax competition, facts on base broadening is less interesting to us. 
 A relevant overlap for this paper between the literature on tax competition and the one    
on ﬁscal federalism is the concept of vertical externalities and ﬁscal interdependence. The 
idea is that the ﬁscal policy set at one level aﬀects the tax levying capacities at the other 
level, creating a vertical spillover that can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. That issue has 
been investigated theoretically by Flowers (1988), Boadway et al. (1998) and Dalhby 
(2003) which are papers that ﬁrst studied the importance of vertical externalities in 
federations. Empirical studies show contradictory results in terms of size and sign of the 
interaction. Besley and Rosen (1998) ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of vertical spillover using 
U.S. data from 1975 to 1989 on gasoline and cigarettes tax rates. Their study shows that a 
federal tax rate increase triggers a sizable positive response in the local rate. The article of 
Goodspeed (2000) ﬁnds a negative correlation between local and federal rates in 10 OECD 
countries between 1975 and 1984 using income taxation data. So there exists a sort of 
competition between local and federal layers, however in our model that interaction is 
internalized by each country while in the literature those spillover are caused by 
uncoordinated decision making. Still, tax bases overlapping and being considered as joint 
property by two levels of government create an ineﬃciency which can be seen as a negative 
vertical externality. Those concepts will be well highlighted when introducing the model of 
overlapping tax bases, in which both levy tax revenue on the same base. 
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3. Model 
3.1 Benchmark model 
 Our methodology consists in extending a baseline model which is in inspired by Zodrow    
and Mieszkowski (1986) and synthesized by Krogstrup (2004). That framework introduces 
a model of tax competition that investigates the impact of capital mobility on tax rates 
and the provision of public goods. It is a one period model, in which an inﬁnity of identical 
countries compete for a mobile tax base, each choosing its tax rate as a strategic variable 
to attract it. Those countries are considered small, which means that the international 
after-tax return r is imposed to them without them having any possibility of inﬂuencing it. 
Those countries are composed of three sectors : the private production, a government and 
one representative citizen. It receives utility from both public and private spending :  
(1)  &   &  &  &  
The public good g is ﬁnanced by taxing capital at the source according to the following 
budget constraint : 
(2)   &  
Hence, capital employed in the country represents tax base for the ﬁnancing of the public 
good, and it is also the one and only input to the production process, owned by the 
representative citizen. Capital has usual decreasing marginal productivity properties : 
&   &   &  
The budget constraint of the representative citizen will depend on whether the economy is 
in autarky or open to the rest of the world, or to put it diﬀerently if capital is mobile or 
not. Given that budget constraint and its own, the government considered as a benevolent 
entity will choose the tax rate to maximize the utility of the representative citizen. 
u
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"12
Under autarky 
 In the case of autarky, capital cannot ﬂow in and out of the country in response to    
changes in tax rate : capital mobility is inexistent. As a consequence, the capital employed 
in the country will be equal to the endowment of that country, & . 
&  
As we are in a one period model, the representative citizen will spend all its income on 
private consumption, equal to the output minus taxes paid to ﬁnance the public good : 
(3)   &  
Utility maximization (1) with respect to the tax rate, subjected to (2) and (3) yields  the 6
following ﬁrst order condition : 
&  
The government will adjust the tax rate so that the marginal utility of private and public 
spendings by the representative citizen are equalized. Hence, if capital is immobile, at 
optimum raising public spendings by one unit means losing exactly one unit of private 
spendings. As a result, the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) is one : in autarky, we 
have a ﬁrst best optimum in which the pubic good is eﬃciently provisioned. 
!
Under open economy 
 Now that the economy is open to international capital markets, changes in tax rates will    
cause capital to ﬂow in and out of the country to regain the exogenous after tax return r. 
Hence, the following arbitrage condition applies for all i : 
k
i
k
i
= k
i
xi = fi (ki )− ti ki
u
gi
u
xi
= 1
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 proof in annex a.6
(4)  &  
An increase in the tax rate will trigger a capital outﬂow so that the increase in t is met by 
an equal increase in the gross rate of return of capital to regain the international after-tax 
return. The extent of that outﬂow is determined by the elasticity of capital to the tax rate, 
obtained by totally diﬀerentiating the arbitrage condition with respect to the tax rate.  
&  
which gives us the following elasticity of capital to the tax rate, assumed smaller than one : 
&  
The budget constraint of the representative citizen now has to include the interests 
received (paid) as a capital exporter (importer) if the capital employed in the country is 
lower (higher) that the original endowment. 
(5)  &  
Increasing the tax rate now erodes the tax base by causing capital to ﬂow out of the 
country, leaving less capital to tax. That eﬀect was absent of the autarky case because 
since capital could not react to a tax increase, the amount of capital to be taxed remaining 
unchanged, an increase in public spendings resulted in an equal decrease in private 
spendings. Here, additional to that decrease, a tax base erosion eﬀect occurs and it 
depends on the elasticity. That diﬀerence appears in the maximization of (1) with respect 
to the tax rate, subjected to (2), (4) and (5)  : 7
&  
fki − ti = r
fkiki
∂ki
∂ti
dti − dti = 0⇒
∂ki
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 proof in annex b.7
Hence, the MCPF in open economy is larger that one at optimum : more that one unit of 
private consumption needs to be sacriﬁced to increase public consumption by one unit. As 
such, at optimum, the marginal utility of public spendings is higher than the one of private 
spending, creating a distortion compared to the autarky case. 
 In a multi country setting, each country, taking the tax rates of the others as given, has    
an incentive to decrease its own in order to attract the mobile tax base, leading to race to 
the bottom. Indeed, each government undercuts the other by setting a lower rate so that 
capital ﬂows in until the cost in terms of lost tax revenue (due to the tax decrease) and the 
gain in terms of base inﬂow balance out. A sub optimal equilibrium is reached, in which 
the overall amount of capital (across all countries) is the same but the level of public good 
is ineﬃciently low. This is the key result of the literature on tax competition : when capital 
is mobile, public goods set at a sub-optimal level and are under-provided. 
!
Extending the baseline model with a second public good 
This paper intends to develop a model of tax competition that roots in the one just 
presented, to which we add a federal layer and a second public good shared at that level. 
Among the inﬁnity of competing countries, we distinguish two small countries that form a 
federation and ﬁnance a common public good through a federal budget. They still compete 
to attract an amount of capital that is endowed to the whole federation and mobile 
between them . Hence we write : 8
&  
The federation remains small : the after tax return is exogenous and imposed to them. The 
representative citizen now receives utility from three sources : consumption of the private 
k
1
+ k
2
= K = k
1
+ k
2
⇒ k
2
= K − k
1
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 the fact that both countries share the total endowment in tax base is inspired by a feature of the seminal 8
paper by Wildasin (1988)
good, of the local public good and of the federal public good. We will use the following 
utility function : 
(6)  &   &   &   &  
where gi is a local good, enjoyed and ﬁnanced only by country i and G is a federal public 
good shared among the two countries, enjoyed and ﬁnanced by both. 
The objective of the government remains to maximize this utility, using the local and the 
federal tax rates as strategic variables and subjected to a budget constraint at both those 
layers. Those constraints will be deﬁned further on, depending on whether we use a model 
with separate or overlapping tax bases. 
!
3.2 Model with diﬀerent tax bases 
We start with a two country model in which the local good is ﬁnanced by source taxation 
on physical capital k, and the federal good by source taxation on human capital h.  Each 
country is endowed with an amount of physical and human capital, and the total 
endowments in the federation will become mobile as countries open. Hence we have :
&  
&  
 Moreover, as mentioned before, the second good is ﬁnanced by both countries. The 
government’s program is subjected to two budgetary constraints, one for each level : 
(2)  &  
(7)  &  
The production function also takes into account the fact that now another type of capital 
enters the production process with the following properties : 
ui (xi;gi;G) uxi ,ugi ,uG > 0 uxixi ,ugigi ,uGG < 0 uxigi ,uxiG ,ugixi ,ugiG ,uGxi ,uGgi = 0
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  &   &   &   &   &   &  
!
Under autarky 
Both physical and human capital cannot move abroad in reaction of an increase of either 
local or federal tax rates, respectively. As a consequence, the tax bases will be equal to the 
initial endowments. 
&   &  
The budget constraint of the representative citizen is similar to the one in the baseline, but 
now includes taxes on human capital : 
(8)  &  
Utility maximization of (6) with respect to the local and federal tax rates as strategic 
variables, subjected to (2), (7) and (8) yields  the following system : 9
&  
Just as in the baseline model, but now with two layers of government, the marginal costs of 
public funds (local and federal, respectively MCLPF and MCFPF) are equal to one in the 
autarky case. That means for the government that an increase in public spendings at one 
of the two levels (federal or local) translates either into a one to one decrease in private 
consumption or into a one to one decrease in public spendings at the other level. At 
optimum, in the autarky case, marginal utilities obtained from the three sources cited 
above are equalized : both public goods are eﬃciently provided. 
yi = fi (ki;hi ) fki > 0 fkiki < 0 fhi > 0 fhihi < 0 fkihi , fhiki = 0
k
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⎪
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 proof in annex c9
Open economy 
Now that the federation is open to the rest of the world, physical and human capital are 
accessed internationally through independent and separate markets, their respective after-
tax returns being exogenous to the two countries. Changes in the local tax rate will cause 
physical capital to ﬂow in and out of the country to the other to regain the exogenous after 
tax return r, just as changes in the federal rate will trigger human capital outﬂows and 
inﬂows to regain w. 
Just as before but now with a second market, we have the two following arbitrage 
conditions : 
(4)  &  
(9)  &  
An increase in either one of the rates will cause an outﬂow of the corresponding type of 
capital so that the gross rate of return meets the international one. How much of that 
capital has to move abroad depends on the elasticity of that capital to its tax rate. As 
before, totally diﬀerentiating the arbitrage conditions allows to obtain it for both physical 
and human capital : 
&  
&  
Moreover, the new private budget constraint, comparable to the one in the baseline case 
under open economy but now with a second type of capital, writes : 
(10) &  
fki − ti = r
fhi −Ti = w
ε ki
ti = −
ti
ki fkiki
> 0
εhi
Ti = −
Ti
hi fhihi
> 0
xi = fi (ki;hi )− tiki −Tihi + r(ki − ki )+w(hi − hi )
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The government maximizes the utility function (6) with respect to both tax rates, 
subjected to the two public budget constraints (2) and (7), the two arbitrage conditions (4) 
and (9) and the private budget constraint (10) : we obtain the MCPFs  for country i. 10
Considering the local public good and its tax base, physical capital, the baseline situation 
is as expected replicated. At equilibrium raising local public spendings by one unit means 
decreasing private spendings by more than one : the marginal cost of local public funds 
(MCLPF) will necessarily by higher than one, creating a distortion compared to the 
autarky case. 
&  
Hence, the local public good sets at a sub optimally low level. 
 Analyzing the impact of capital mobility on the federal public good and its tax base,    
human capital, allows us to obtain the ﬁrst result of this paper. Contrary to the local good, 
the federal one is shared which means that is it ﬁnanced and enjoyed by both countries. As 
a consequence, if country i raises its federal tax rate, human capital will ﬂow out but it will 
do so in country j which ﬁnances the federal good that country i enjoys as well. At 
optimum, compared to a situation in which that good is not shared, less private 
consumption has to be sacriﬁced to raise federal spendings since the eroding tax base will 
be taxed in the other country to ﬁnance that same federal spending. We have : 
&  
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 proof in annex d.10
A distortion appears compared to the autarky case but it is lower than the one aﬀecting 
the local good that is not shared : the marginal cost of federal public funds (MCFPF) is 
lower . The ratio reﬂects an horizontal eﬀect that appears between the two countries at 11
the federal level. It diﬀers from the local good for which the two countries have no way of 
countering the ineﬃciency that results from tax competition. They keep undercutting each 
other to attract physical until equilibrium is reached, delivering a suboptimal outcome. 
When it comes to the federal public good, they internalize the fact that wherever the tax 
base is located, it will ﬁnance a good that they will enjoy : the need to undercut the other 
is lower. To put it diﬀerently, raising public spendings for a shared public good costs less in 
terms of private spendings compared to a non shared one. 
 Result 1.a. When capital is mobile, the provision of a shared public good will be less    
downward distorted than with a non shared public good. 
!
 At this point, it is useful to express the equilibrium occurring in the second country  :   12
&  
!
We observe that the country with the highest federal tax rate has a MCFPF higher than 
one, while the one with the lowest rate has a MCFPF lower than one, as drawn in ﬁgure 1. 
The country with the highest tax rate has its representative citizen under provided with 
federal public good while the country with the lowest rate has its over provided with it. 
From an eﬃciency point of view, over or under-provision is equally bad, but that means 
that tax competition with a shared public good does not necessarily leads to a race to the 
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 assuming strictly positive tax rates, this is always true11
 we assume suﬃciently low elasticities so that the denominators are strictly positive12
bottom. To put it diﬀerently, the country with the lowest rate at equilibrium has its 
representative citizen provided with too large of an amount of federal good for the tax rate 
that is set in his/her country. Given that rate, it could have had more private good if 
resources had been allocated diﬀerently. Hence, as long as tax rates are diﬀerent, 
ineﬃciencies appear on both ends as a result of uncoordinated behavior across the 
federation. 
 Result 1.b As long as federal tax rates are diﬀerent, there will be an over-provision for    
one country and an under-provision for the other. 
!
!
Horizontal equalization 
We observe that if federal tax rates are equal, then the under-provision of one country and 
the over-provision of the other are wiped out. This can occur if countries are symmetric, in 
which case federal tax rates align automatically. Or it happens if countries can coordinate 
at the federal level, provided they have the necessary institutional framework to do so. 
Such a coordination would allow the federation to depart from the equilibrium reached 
"21
ﬁgure 1. model with diﬀerent tax bases
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under uncoordinated behavior. The importance of ﬁscal coordination has been recognized 
by the European Commission (1997), and steps have been taken to harmonize some 
taxation policies. For example, European countries have been implementing harmonizing 
reforms regarding VAT (Majocchi, 2008), with a system of investigators to insure 
compliance to these rules. An horizontal equalization (deﬁned as the alignment of the 
federal tax rates) yields the equalization of the marginal utility from the consumption of 
the private good and from the consumption of the federal public good.  
Indeed if T1=T2, then the MCFPF is equal to one just as in autarky in both countries : 
raising federal spendings translate into a one to one decrease in private consumption.  
 Result 1.c The federation can restore an eﬃcient provision of the federal public good    
for both countries by setting equal federal tax rates. The local public good remains under 
provided. 
!
Indeed, at T1=T2,, if country i raises its federal tax rate assuming country j’s constant, the 
lost federal tax revenue corresponding to the fringe of tax base that ﬂows out will be 
exactly matched by a gain in federal tax revenue in country j to ﬁnance the federal shared 
good : the horizontal externality is full. But as soon as a country departs from that 
equilibrium and undercuts the other, ineﬃciencies immediately appears for both of them as 
that horizontal eﬀect does not completely apply. 
!
3.3 Model with same tax bases 
Introducing a second public good, shared at the federal level, results in an horizontal eﬀect 
that mitigates the ineﬃciency in the provision of that good. Cooperation even makes it 
possible to remove the distortion completely. We now turn to a model in which both public 
goods are ﬁnanced by taxing physical capital, such as a two-layered corporate income tax 
"22
that would generate both local and federal tax revenues. Hence, human capital disappears 
completely from the model, going back to the baseline model production function : 
&   &   &  
The new feature of that model is that both public goods have the same tax base. The local 
one is ﬁnanced by a local tax and the federal one by a federal tax, both levied on physical 
capital. Just as before, governments of the two countries will choose their rates to 
maximize the utility of their representative citizen, under the following public budget 
constraints : 
(2)  &  
(11)  &  
!
Under autarky 
Physical capital cannot move abroad when the local or the federal rate increases. As such, 
the tax base will be equal to the initial endowment in physical capital of the country. 
&  
Private consumption follows : 
(12)  &  
Maximization of (6) subjected to (2), (11) and (12) leads to the same results  as in the 13
previous model in which tax bases were diﬀerent. At optimum, marginal utilities from the 
consumption of the private good, the local public good and the federal public good are 
equal, implying MCFPF and MCLPF equal to one. 
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 proof in annex e.13
&  
Increasing the consumption of one of those three by one unit means decreasing one of the 
other two by one unit (holding the remaining one constant). Having the same MCPF at 
both layers of government means that both public goods set the same level. And since they 
have the same tax base, the two tax rates are equal as well. 
!
Under open economy 
Capital can now ﬂow out towards the other country in reaction of an increased tax rate at 
either one of the level of government (local or federal). Previous assumptions on the nature 
of the federation (small countries) still apply, hence we have the following arbitrage 
condition : 
(13)  &  
An increase in either one of the rates will trigger a capital outﬂow to regain the world 
after-tax return. The size of that outﬂow depends on the elasticity of physical capital to 
that tax rate. Totally diﬀerentiating the arbitrage conditions allows to obtain those two 
elasticities (one for the local tax rate, one for the federal one) : 
&  
&  
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Private budget constraint in this framework includes input minus tax paid at the local and 
the federal levels, plus (minus) interests received (paid) : 
(14)  &  
 We saw in the previous section that sharing the federal public good, while ﬁnancing it    
with a diﬀerent tax base than the local public good, allows to trigger horizontal eﬀects that 
mitigate the ineﬃciency in its provision. The non shared local good remains under 
provided, as no such eﬀects can be exploited. 
Now, each government when choosing its rates takes into account that, ﬁrst, the ﬁnancing 
of the federal good is shared and, second, the fact that both goods are ﬁnanced through 
taxation of physical capital. Those interactions produce new substitution eﬀects that 
change the equilibrium. Indeed, now that we have one tax base for two public goods, 
capital mobility produces vertical (between the local and federal levels of government of 
the same country) and cross eﬀects (between diﬀerent level of government of diﬀerent 
countries) on top of the horizontal ones. Those interactions relate to the externalities 
mentioned in the ﬁscal federalism literature. 
In our model, an increased federal rate will cause capital to ﬂow out, leading to a shrinking 
in the base of the federal good, but in the base of the local good as well. So even if the 
local rate is held constant, the level of the local public good will decrease as there is less 
capital to tax to ﬁnance it. The same goes for the local rate towards the provision of the 
federal good. Having diﬀerent bases (physical and human capital) means that the 
equilibrium taking place at one level of government has no impact on the one happening at 
the other level. Now that both public goods are ﬁnanced through taxation of the same 
base, raising the rate of one of them creates a negative externality for the other : this is the 
vertical eﬀect. It is a sign of vertical spillover existing between the two layers of the 
xi = fi (ki )− tiki −Tiki + r(ki − ki )
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government, something that is well highlighted in the literature on overlapping tax bases as 
mentioned in section 2. 
As the federal good remains shared, the horizontal eﬀects that already appeared in the 
previous section still arise : raising the federal tax rate makes capital ﬂow out, but in the 
other country that ﬁnances that same good, mitigating its under-provision.  
Finally, the overlapping tax bases now link the federal layer of each country to the local 
one of the other, and vice versa. Indeed,, raising the federal rate will cause some tax base 
to ﬂow in the other country that will be able to ﬁnance the federal good but also more of 
its own local good, which is not shared. Hence, some of the eroding tax base in country i 
will be « diverted » to the ﬁnancing of the local good of country j, while in the case of 
diﬀerent tax bases this was impossible. We call this externality a cross eﬀect that, as 
explained further, will lead to the under-provision of the federal public good under 
horizontal equalization. 
 Totally diﬀerentiating the arbitrage condition with respect to both tax rates in    
combination with the deﬁnitions of the elasticities allows us to solve further and to obtain 
the following result  at equilibrium : 14
&  
This means that at equilibrium, with the local and the federal public goods having 
overlapping tax bases, the local and federal tax rates are equalized (which we call vertical 
equalization, we note &  that rate that hence applies at the local and the federal level) 
leading to the same level of local and federal public goods, and hence the same marginal 
utility. We note that this result is consistent with the fact that we had equal local and 
federal tax rates at optimum in autarky as well.  
ugi = uG
τ
i
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 proof in annex f14
 Result 2.a When two public goods have the same tax base, at equilibrium the tax rates    
that ﬁnance them are equal. Hence their provision is equal. 
!
Indeed, the government of each country has the capacity of internalizing the vertical eﬀects 
by setting equal tax rates, canceling out the relative distortion between the provision of the 
local and the federal good. 
Since we have the same tax rates, elasticity of capital with respect to both rates is the 
same : 
&  
Those results allow us to express  the MCLPF and MCFPF  : 15 16
&  
As the level of the two public goods and their corresponding tax rate are the same, is it 
clear that they will be equally provided, and that raising the level of one or the other will 
cost the same amount in terms of private consumption. As such, MCLPF and MCFPF are 
the same, we will refer further to the MCPF without distinction between the local or the 
federal level. To analyze those results further we can express the equilibrium happening in 
both countries : 
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 we use the equality of marginal utilities from the public goods and plug it into either one of the ﬁrst order 15
conditions
 again assuming low enough elasticities so that we have strictly positive denominators16
&  
Depending on how capital is allocated across the federation given the arbitrage conditions 
and elasticities of the two countries, equilibrium can happen according to four diﬀerent 
cases, represented in ﬁgure 2 : 
&  
 Case a. One country has over-provided public goods, the other has its under-   
provided if . If at equilibrium a country sets its rates more than twice as high as 
the other, then its public goods are under-provided while they are over-provided in the 
other country. Indeed, if the tax rates of country j are that high due to uncoordinated 
behavior, then a lot of the tax base locates in country i and serves as base for its local 
good as well, which is then over-provided considering its own lower tax rate. Hence, it is 
possible to have an over-provision of the local public good, while the under-provision was 
unavoidable in previous models. Conversely, setting rates that high means for country j 
having a lot of capital outﬂow towards country i that doesn’t provide that much federal 
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tax revenue to the federal public good : as a result it is under provided for country j. That 
downward distortion due to the ﬂeeing tax base impacts on the provision of the local good, 
making it under provided as well. 
 Case b. The public goods are under provided in both countries if " . As    
long as no country has its tax rates more than twice as high as the other, both of them has 
its representative citizen under provided with the local and the federal public goods. 
Moreover, the country that has the highest rate has the strongest downward distortion due 
to base erosion. 
 Case c. One country has an eﬃcient provision of its public goods while the    
other has its under provided if " . At this equilibrium, we have the following 
results : 
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ﬁgure 2. model with overlapping tax bases
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For country i, optimum is fully restored at the local and the federal levels just as in the 
autarky case. The MCFPF and the MCLPF are both equal to one, hence raising public 
spendings at a level of government by one unit translates into a one to one decrease in 
private consumption or in public spendings at the other level, creating no ineﬃciency. 
Hence, for those rates, the allocation of capital across the federation settles so that 
optimum happens in country i. However, country j has its own public goods necessarily 
under provided. In the model with diﬀerent tax bases, the federation was able to obtain an 
eﬃcient provision of the federal public good for both countries (and could not do anything 
about the under-provision of the local public good) by setting equal federal tax rates. Here, 
it can reach an eﬃcient provision for both public goods but for only one country at once. 
Having MCPF equal to one for the two countries at the same time is now impossible. 
 Result 2.b With overlapping tax bases, the federation can restore full autarky    
optimum but only for one of the two countries at once. 
!
This equilibrium is hardly tenable politically. Country j would have to accept having that 
high of a tax rate to restore optimum in country i at the expense of the utility of its own 
representative citizen. 
!
 Case d. Both countries have equal under-provision of their public goods :    
horizontal equalization happens. In the previous model, horizontal equalization 
(alignment of the two federal tax rates) that stemmed either from symmetry or 
cooperation allowed to restore the eﬃcient provision of the federal public good for both 
countries. As the MCFPF was equal to one, it was neither under nor over-provided. Here, 
if the two countries of the federation equalize their federal tax rates, they will have the 
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same provision of federal and local public goods but it will not be eﬃcient anymore. We 
have the following ratios after setting equal tax rates for both countries  : 17
&  
First, we note that we go back to the same MCLPF as in previous models. Hence, the local 
public good of each country sets at the same sub-optimal level as in the baseline model and 
the model with diﬀerent tax bases : raising its level will cost the same amount in terms of 
private consumption. Second, base erosion aﬀects both levels of government but the one 
happening at the federal level will be cancelled out because of the horizontal equalization. 
To put it diﬀerently, at & , country i knows that if it raises its rates assuming country 
j’s ones constant, the loss of federal tax revenue due to the capital outﬂow will be exactly 
compensated by a gain in federal tax revenue in country j. This allowed the eﬃcient 
provision of the federal public good in the previous model. Here however, if countries do 
not compete anymore for capital at the federal level, they still compete for that same tax 
base at the local level to ﬁnance their respective local public good. That competition is of 
the same nature than the one happening in the baseline model in which there was only a 
single non shared public good, yielding that sub-optimal equilibrium. And now that bases 
are linked, country i knows that raising its tax rates will cause tax base to ﬂow out, 
generating tax revenue for country j’s local good as well which country i does not enjoy. 
Hence, tax competition at the local level is replicated on the federal level : this is the cross 
eﬀect that sets the federal good at an ineﬃciently low level compared to the model with 
diﬀerent tax bases. As a consequence, the provision of the federal good is equally 
downward distorted : the MCFPF is necessarily higher than one. 
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 again, either with symmetry or cooperation17
Comparing equilibria under horizontal equalization 
Let us compare the equilibria of the two models (with diﬀerent and with same tax bases) 
when the two countries harmonize their tax rates (either because they have the 
institutional framework to cooperate or because they are symmetric). If tax bases are 
diﬀerent, we have the following ratios : 
&  
If tax bases are the same, we have those : 
&  
We can see that the local good is necessarily under-provided, to the same extent in both 
cases. However, in the model with diﬀerent tax bases, only the provision of the local public 
good is downward distorted. In the model with a single tax base, both public goods will be 
equally under provided. 
 Result 2.c Under horizontal equalization, overlapping tax bases replicate the    
ineﬃciency aﬀecting the local good onto the provision of the federal good, distorting it to 
the same extent. With diﬀerent tax bases, this was absent. 
!
Comparing those two equilibria yields the well known result of the literature on 
overlapping tax bases. With separate bases, tax rate harmonization leads to the eﬃcient 
provision of the federal public good. With the two layers of government sharing the same 
tax base, that same harmonization produces an ineﬃcient provision and hence ineﬃcient 
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decision making. This is a cause of concern for federations that intend to harmonize their 
tax rates at the federal level if those rates levy revenue on bases that overlap with taxes at 
the local level.  
!
3 Extension : a model with transfers 
We developed in the previous section a model of tax competition with concepts of shared 
public goods. Using those, we move to a model with diﬀerent tax bases in which the federal 
public good of country 1 is only partially shared. Indeed, we set up a model in which 
country 2 transfers part of the provision of its federal public good to country 1, meaning 
that country 2 ﬁnances part of its own federal good and part of country 1’s. Hence we have 
the following utility function : 
&  
with the three sources of utility having the same properties as before. 
The extent of the transfers is measured with the parameter & , according to the following 
updated federal budget constraints : 
&  
&  
where & . As such, the higher the & , the higher country 2 transfers federal spendings to 
the other country of the federation. As &  tends to zero, we go back to a situation in which 
the public goods are not shared and the distortion due to tax competition is at its highest. 
Indeed, we get back to the usual budget constraints with non shared goods. As it tends to 
one, country 2 forfeits utility from its federal good and transfers its whole federal tax 
revenue to ﬁnance country 1’s, as shown below. 
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The rest of the model follows the equations of the previous model with diﬀerent tax bases, 
in terms of local public budget constraint (2), private budget constraint (10) and arbitrage 
conditions (4) and (9). Maximization by the governments with respect to the local and 
federal tax rates now yields  the following MCFPF for the federation : 18
&  
Let us remind that, without transfers (if theta were equal to zero), we would have the 
following ratios : 
&  
which are the ones we get with non shared goods. 
Comparing those results shows that the MCFPF for country 2 is necessarily higher with 
transfers, and increasing in &  : now that there are transfers, raising the federal rate means 
forfeiting part of the corresponding tax revenue to country 1, which implies an additional 
cost on top of losing tax base. That cost is reﬂected in the ratio of MCFPF for country 2, 
and it leads to a more pronounced under-provision of federal good for that country. 
Moreover, observing MCFPF for country 1, which beneﬁts from the transfers, shows it is 
less costly in terms of private consumption to raise its federal spendings. This is due to an 
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 proof in annex g. Moreover, here we only consider the case of open economy, as it doesn’t make much sense 18
to study autarky in a model with transfers. Plus, we only display results for MCFPF as the local level of the 
problem remains unchanged.
interaction of the type of the horizontal externality developed in previous section, although 
reduced. Indeed, country 1 has lowered incentives to undercut the other country to attract 
its tax base as that base ﬁnances its own federal good as well. As a result, the MCFPF for 
country 1 is necessarily reduced as long as &  is positive and transfers occur. In fact, the 
MCFPF is decreasing in &  as more transfers translate into a less costly base erosion eﬀect. 
 Result 3.a When a country of the federation transfers part of its federal tax revenues    
to the other, its MCFPF is increased while the one of the receiving country is reduced. 
!
Note that we can also compare those MCFPF to the ones obtained in the regular model of 
diﬀerent tax bases, in which the federal good was fully shared. In that model, both 
countries ﬁnance the federal good and both enjoy it. Here, for the country that receives the 
federal transfers, the MCFPF is lower with transfers compared to a situation in which the 
good is not be shared, but higher than in the model with diﬀerent tax bases : 
&  
We see that transfers are less useful of a ﬁscal institution to counter the under-provision of 
the public good for country 1 than a fully shared public good. Indeed, an outﬂow of human 
capital due to a federal rate increase translates into less of a horizontal externality than 
with a fully shared public good. Still, transfers help to mitigate the under-provision of that 
good compared to a situation in which the good is not shared. 
Besides, horizontal equalization ( ) doesn’t restore optimum anymore. Here, setting 
equal tax rates leads to the following MCFPF : 
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&  
which is necessarily higher than one. 
 Result 3.b When a country of the federation transfers part of its federal tax revenues    
to the other, optimum cannot be restored by harmonizing tax rates anymore. 
!
Getting MCFPF for country 1 closer to one would require from ﬁscal authorities to set &  
closer to one as well, which increases MCFPF for country 2. Hence in a model of transfers 
the federation has to sacriﬁce utility in country 2 in order to remove ineﬃciencies in 
country 1, which raises political feasibility issues. 
!
5 Conclusion 
Our paper showed that the classic conclusions of the literature on tax competition can be 
put in perspective when we consider the case of a federation of countries that ﬁnance 
together a public good, relating with the literature on ﬁscal federalism. Those models 
introduce the fact that in the case of shared federal public goods, the base that erodes goes 
to a country that ﬁnances the good enjoyed by the very country that lost some of its base. 
In both models, those interactions can, depending on the case, mitigate the under-provision 
of public goods or even lead to an over-provision. 
In a model with diﬀerent tax bases, the federation can restore an eﬃcient provision of the 
federal good for both countries at the same time by harmonizing tax rates. While in a 
model with single tax base, this is made impossible as only one country can enjoy an 
eﬃcient provision of the federal good at once, however optimum applies for the local good 
MCFPF
1
=
1
1− (1−θ )ε
h1
T1
>1
MCFPF
2
=
1
(1−θ )(1− ε
h2
T2 )
>1
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
θ
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as well. In that model, harmonizing tax rates replicates the ineﬃciency to the federal level. 
We also proposed a model with transfers, in which the MCFPF of a country can be 
reduced at the expense of the other country. However, optimum is impossible to reach. 
Potential extensions to that framework include the ones presented in the literature review. 
We can also imagine that trade in private good between the countries could happen and 
trigger additional interactions.  
Another potential extension could be to extent the federation by include more countries 
and see if the results presented above still hold. This would be a relevant analysis if we 
consider the case of the European Union that keeps including more member countries while 
attempting to harmonize tax rates. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Annex
Proof a. Autarky equilibrium in the baseline model 
&  
Proof b. Open economy equilibrium in the baseline model 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Proof c. Autarky equilibrium in the model with diﬀerent tax bases 
!
!
!
!
!
!
Max
ti
 ui ( fi (ki )− ti ki;ti ki )
First order condition writes 
∂ui
∂ti
= −kiuxi + kiugi = 0
⇒
ugi
uxi
= 1
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We can rewrite the private budget constraint (5) and use the arbitrage condition (4) :
xi = fi (ki )− (ti + r)ki + r(ki ) = fi (ki )− fkiki + rki
Hence we have the following maximization program :
Max
ti
 ui ( fi (ki )− fkiki + rki;tiki )
First order condition writes 
∂ui
∂ti
= fki
∂ki
∂ti
− fkikiki
∂ki
∂ti
− fki
∂ki
∂ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
uxi + ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ugi = 0
⇒
ugi
uxi
=
fkikiki
∂ki
∂ti
ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
=
1
1− ε ki
Max
ti ;Ti
 ui ( fi (ki;hi )− ti ki −Tihi;ti ki;T1h1 +T2h2 )
First order conditions write 
∂ui
∂ti
= −kiuxi + kiugi = 0
and 
∂ui
∂Ti
= −hiuxi + hiuG = 0 
⇒
ugi
uxi
= 1
uG
uxi
= 1
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
Proof d. Open economy equilibrium in the model with diﬀerent tax base 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Proof e. Autarky equilibrium in the model with same tax bases 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Max
ti ;Ti
 ui ( f (ki )− ti ki −Ti ki;ti ki;T1k1 +T2 k2 )
First order conditions write 
∂ui
∂ti
= −kiuxi + kiugi = 0
and 
∂ui
∂Ti
= −kiuxi + kiuG = 0 
⇒
ugi
uxi
= 1
uG
uxi
= 1
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
We can rewrite the private budget constraint (10) and use the arbitrage conditions (4) and (7) :
xi = fi (ki;hi )− (ti + r)ki − (Ti +w)hi + r(ki )+w(hi ) = fi (ki;hi )− fkiki − fhihi + rki +whi
Hence we have the following maximization program :
Max
ti ;Ti
 ui fi (ki;hi )− fkiki − fhihi + rki +whi;tiki;Tihi +T j (H − hi )( )
First order conditions write 
∂ui
∂ti
= fki
∂ki
∂ti
− fkikiki
∂ki
∂ti
− fki
∂ki
∂ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
uxi + ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ugi = 0
and 
∂ui
∂Ti
= fhi
∂hi
∂Ti
− fhihihi
∂hi
∂Ti
− fhi
∂hi
∂Ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
uxi + hi +Ti
∂hi
∂Ti
−T j
∂hi
∂Ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
uG = 0
⇒
ugi
uxi
=
fkikiki
∂ki
∂ti
ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
=
1
1− εhi
ti
uG
uxi
=
fhihihi
∂hi
∂Ti
hi +Ti
∂hi
∂Ti
−
T j
Ti
Ti
∂hi
∂Ti
=
1
1− 1−
T j
Ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
εhi
Ti
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
Proof f. Open economy equilibrium in the model with same tax bases 
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We can rewrite the private budget constraint (14) and use the arbitrage condition (13) :
xi = fi (ki )− (ti +Ti + r)ki + r(ki ) = fi (ki )− fkiki + rki
Hence we have the following maximization program :
Max
ti ;Ti
 ui fi (ki )− fkiki + rki;tiki;T1k1 +T2 (K − k1)( )
First order conditions write 
∂ui
∂ti
= fki
∂ki
∂ti
− fkikiki
∂ki
∂ti
− fki
∂ki
∂ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
uxi + ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ugi + Ti
∂ki
∂ti
−T j
∂ki
∂ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
uG = 0
and 
∂ui
∂Ti
= fki
∂ki
∂Ti
− fkikiki
∂ki
∂Ti
− fki
∂ki
∂Ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
uxi + ti
∂ki
∂Ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ugi + ki +Ti
∂ki
∂Ti
−T j
∂ki
∂Ti
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
uG = 0
Totally differentiating the arbitrage condition with respect to both tax rates yields :
fkiki
∂ki
∂ti
dti − dti = 0
and fkiki
∂ki
∂Ti
dTi − dTi = 0
⇒
∂ki
∂ti
=
∂ki
∂Ti
=
1
fkiki
Using this result and dividing the order conditions by ki  :
⇒ ugi = uG
Proof g. Equilibrium in a model with transfers 
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We can rewrite the private budget constraint (10) and use the arbitrage conditions (4) and (7) :
xi = fi (ki;hi )− (ti + r)ki − (Ti +w)hi + r(ki )+w(hi ) = fi (ki;hi )− fkiki − fhihi + rki +whi
Hence we have the following maximization program for country 1 :
Max
t1;T1
 u1 ( f1(k1;h1)− fk1k1 − fh1h1 + rk1 +wh1;t1k1;T1h1 +θT2 (H − h1)( )
First order condition with respect to the federal tax rates writes
∂u1
∂T1
= fh1
∂h1
∂T1
− fh1h1h1
∂h1
∂T1
− fh1
∂h1
∂T1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ux1 + h1 +T1
∂h1
∂T1
−θT2
∂h1
∂T1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
uG1 = 0
⇒
uG1
uxi
=
fh1h1h1
∂h1
∂T1
h1 +T1
∂h1
∂T1
−θ
T2
T1
T1
∂h1
∂T1
=
1
1− 1−θ
T2
T1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ε k1
T1
We have the following maximization program for country 2 :
Max
t2 ;T2
 u2 ( f2 (k2;h2 )− fk2k2 − fh2h2 + rk2 +wh2;t2k2;(1−θ )T2h2( )
First order conditions with respect to the federal tax rates writes
∂u2
∂T2
= fh2
∂h2
∂T2
− fh2h2h2
∂h2
∂T2
− fh2
∂h2
∂T2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ux2 + (1−θ ) h2 +T2
∂h2
∂T2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
uG2 = 0
⇒
uG2
ux2
=
fh2h2h2
∂h2
∂T2
(1−θ ) h2 +T2
∂h2
∂T2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
1
(1−θ )(1− ε k2
T2 )
